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PRIVATE LAW
tribution to the emergence of Louisiana mineral law ;53 and still
others, though involving mineral contracts, do not turn on points
of mineral law. 4
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
Policies of insurance continued as a fruitful source of litiga.
tion in the appellate courts during the 1963-64 term. The Insur-
ance Code, with a view to encouraging prompt payment of
claims, contains a number of provisions permitting the recovery
of penalties and attorneys' fees for delay in payment. These
provisions tend to minimize litigation. On the other hand, the
well-settled and justifiable rule that the insurance contract, if
ambiguous, is to be construed against the insurer and liberally
in favor of the insured has a tendency to encourage litigation.
On the whole, the decisions rendered by the courts demonstrate
a creditable restraint in the application of both of these rules.
Most of the cases in this area turned on factual issues not justi-
fying discussion, yet a fair number were sufficiently significant
to bear noting.
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
The family combination automobile policy continues to give
rise to the greatest amount of litigation. A particularly well-
written opinion in this area is the case of Smith v. Insurance
Co. of the State of Pennsylvania.1 It contains an exhaustive re-
view of the cases dealing with the troublesome problem of cov-
erage for the benefit of permittees. The court held a regulation
of the Department of Public Safety forbidding the use of state-
53. Scott v. -Hunt Oil Co., 160 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writs
denied, 245 La. 950, 162 So. 2d 8; Scott v. Ware, 160 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1964) ; State ew rel. Bordelon v. Justice, 160 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964), writs denied, 245 La. 1084, 162 So. 2d 574; Menefee v. Pipes, 159 So. 2d
439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 245 La. 798, 161 So. 2d 276; Armour
v. Smith, 158 So. 2d 446 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writs granted, 245 La. 637,
160 So. 2d 227 (1964) ; Birdsong-Gabriel Oil Co. v. McCain, 154 So. 2d 216 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1963).
54. Martin Timber Co. v. Roy, 244 La. 1050, 156 So. 2d 435 (1963) ; Johnson
v. Lemons, 157 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 161 So. 2d 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
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owned vehicles by civilians effective as a denial of permission
to the son of a lieutenant of state police who was driving a state-
owned car, with the consent of his father, to take his date
home.
2
In dealing with a similar problem, the Third Circuit in
Touchet v. Firemen's Ins. Co.A appears to have extended exist-
ing jurisprudence in holding that a father who gave his son the
use of his car for an evening thereby clothed the son with such
general discretion and control that he was impliedly authorized
to permit another to drive. The resolution of this kind of prob-
lem ought to turn on what the father should reasonably antici-
pate and expect under the circumstances. 4 If, for example, he
furnishes a car for the use of the son on an indefinite basis, as
the latter's discretion may dictate according to the circum-
stances, it should follow that the authority granted to the son
would extend to his letting others drive when this might suit his
convenience since this should have been within the father's con-
templation. It is by no means clear, however, that such action
by the son should be anticipated and impliedly approved by a
father who lends his car to the son for merely an evening of
pleasure. The problem, of course, involves a matter of degree.
The holding of the court seems to be more in keeping with the
position of Justice Sanders, dissenting in Rogillio v. Cazedes-
sus,5 than with the majority opinion.
Under the original language of the family automobile policy,
coverage was held extended to any auto owned by the named
insured." Current policies restrict the basic coverage to the
automobile or automobiles described in the policy. 7 Hence, in
Altazin v. Reed8 it was held that a new automobile bought to re-
place a previously uninsured second car belonging to the named
insured was not within the policy coverage.
In Brouillette v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,9 a city fireman
injured while riding on the rear platform of the city's fire truck
was held not entitled to recover under a policy on his own car
2. To the same effect is Jones v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 161
So. 2d 445 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
3. 159 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
4. Brooks v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 82 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
5. 241 La. 186, 127 So. 2d 734 (1961).
6. See Pel-State Oil Co. v. Weimer, 155 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
7. See Casano v. Cook, 157 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963)
8. 154 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
9. 163 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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inasmuch as the fire truck was furnished for his "regular use"
within the meaning of an exclusion. Previous Louisiana cases
and the weight of authority elsewhere were cited in support.
.The exclusion in question appears to rest on the belief that in
such case the owner of the other car ought to carry the neces-
sary insurance and that the user should not depend on his own
policy to do the work of two for a single premium. In Ellis Elec.
Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,10 an automobile bought by a minor lack-
ing in capacity to contract was counted as a non-owned automo-
bile under his father's policy.
The clause affording coverage with respect to injuries or
damage "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
the owned automobile" has been broadly construed." However,
in Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.' 2 the court declined
to find that an automobile was being "used" by a seven-year-
old child who, apparently while playing in it, released the brake,
permitting it to roll down an incline in a driveway, thereby
striking and killing its mother, who was trying to stop it. The
distinction between "use" and "operation" was noted, and the
former was recognized as extending to cases where the partic-
ular use, considered broadly, was serving some purpose or end
of the permittee. The position of the court was that the child's
action could not be counted as related to any reasonably con-
templated use of the vehicle.
In Bouis v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,'3 the liability in-
surer of a municipality paid a loss resulting from the negligent
operation by the Chief of Police of his own automobile while on
city business. In support of its claim to subrogation against the
Chief of Police the insurer contended that the insurance applied
in favor of the city only and did not apply in favor of the offi-
cial driving his own car. By the terms of the policy the Chief
of Police, as an executive officer of the city, was defined in one
sentence as an insured. Curiously enough, however, the next
sentence undertook to deny to him the benefit of the insurance.
The court considered the language of the policy sufficiently
clear to exclude the Chief of Police from the protection afford-
ed by the policy and, consequently, it felt constrained to sustain
.10. 153 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
11 Bolton v. North River Ins. Co., 102 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
12. 154 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
13. 160 So. 2d 36 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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the insurer's claim to subrogation in the amount of the payment
made by it on behalf of the city. This prompted a concurring
opinion by Judge Tate, who observed that, although the result
reached was not inconsistent with legal principles announced by
the Supreme Court relating to the master-servant relationship,
he nevertheless believed that the court might wish to re-examine
the problem.1 4 If protection to the city was the only objective,
inasmuch as it could alone have been made the insured with re-
spect to any non-owned automobile while driven by an executive
officer in the business of the city, it is not clear why the officer
was listed as an insured. In any event, since an insurer is not
entitled to subrogation against its own insured and since the
officer was clearly designated an insured, by definition, the
right of subrogation might well have been denied regardless of
whether or not the insurance otherwise applied in his favor.
On the basis of the present jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court it appears that an insurer does not have a direct right of
action, under article 2315 of the Civil Code, against a third
party responsible for a loss for which it must indemnify its in-
sured, nor is it legally subrogated to the insured's claim. 5 Two
cases decided during the last term, however, contain language
contrary to these views.' 6
The duty of the insurer to defend an action brought against
the insured, whether groundless or not, was considered in two
cases wherein the allegations of the petition were deemed con-
trolling.'7 The Smith case' 8 qualified this rule by holding that
if the insurer is successful in proving absence of coverage, it
cannot be held to have breached the duty. The court explained
that under the terms of the policy the obligation of the insurer
was to defend any suit against "the insured" and that the
driver, operating the car in violation of applicable regulations,
was not an insured.
14. A writ of certiorari was not sought.
15. See Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Transp. Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d, 228
(1957) ; Comment, The Role of Subrogation by Operation of Law and Related
Problem8 in the In8urance Field, 22 LA. L. REv. 225 (1961).
16. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Wheeling Pipeline, 162 So. 2d 411
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) ; McDaniel v. Hearn, 158 So. 2d 348 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963).
17. C. A. Collins & Son v. Pope Bros. Steam Cleaning Co., 155 So. 2d 278
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ; Kamm v. Morgan, 157 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963).
18. 161 So. 2d 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964). See text at note .1 supra..
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The insurer's reliance on the cooperation clause by way of
defense was rejected in Stuckey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.19 on the
authority of West v. Monroe Bakery,20 there being no showing
of collusion between the insured and the injured party. This
position finds clear support in the West case. Perhaps Bernard
v. Hungerford2l is in accord, although it contained no mention
of the West rule.
It is settled that an injured person cannot twice recover the
same medical expenses under the same policy. 22 Relying on this
rule, the insurer in Gandy v. Feazel,23 sued by children claiming
damages for the death of their mother, asserted the right to
deduct from its policy limit the amounts it had paid to the
father, and hospitals, for medical expenses under the medical
expense provision. The court found the insurer's position un-
tenable.
In a case of first impression,2 4 it was held that under the
provisions of a liability policy the insurer is liable for interest
.until payment of the judgment only on the maximum payment
due under the policy and not on the total amount of the judg-
ment. The court concluded that a contrary holding would lead
to an absurd consequence.
FIRE
Valued Policy Law
Ever since the case of Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific
Fire Ins. Co.,25 it has been generally believed that the valued
policy law does not preclude an inquiry into insurable interest.
During the 1962-63 term the Second Circuit held in The Forge
Inc. v. Peerless Cas. Co.26 that the Lighting Fixture case is no
longer valid because of a change in the language of the valued
policy provision of the Insurance Code and that the insurer
19. 158 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
20. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
21. 157 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
22. Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So. 2d 11 (1962) ; Briley v. North River
Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
23. 155 So. 2d 474 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
24. James v. State, 154 So. 2d 497 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
25. 176 La. 499, 146 So. 35 (1932).
26. 131 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
, 9651
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must now pay the face amount of the policy even when the in-
sured's interest is limited.27
During the 1963-64 term the same Circuit followed its hold-
ing in The Forge Inc. case28 and, in addition, the Fourth Circuit,
taking the same view, permitted a lessee to recover the face
amount of a fire policy covering improvements made by him
although they were to become the property of the lessor at the
end of a five-year lease, only five months of which remained
unexpired at the time of the loss.29 The theory that the face
amount of a policy covering a limited interest constitutes mere-
ly the agreed value may have some validity where the interest
does not change during the life of the policy. The same cannot
be said where the interest continues to diminish such as the
interest of a lessee in improvements which are to become the
property of the lessor. Better would it be to continue to recog-
nize that, except where the valued policy law properly applies,
a policy of fire insurance is a contract of indemnity and thus
avoid increasing the moral hazard by holding out an undue re-
ward for successfully contrived arson. The 1964 legislature has
done this.80
LIFE
Misrepresentations
Section 619B of the Insurance Code' seems to afford the in-
surer a defense when a false and material representation is made
in the application for a policy of life insurance. Nevertheless,
present jurisprudence of the Supreme Court may be counted as
requiring the presence of an intent to deceive on the part of the
applicant, a position not free from question.82 During the last
term, however, the Supreme Court refused certiorari in a case
wherein it was held that deceit does not have to be shown by
27. See criticism of the case in Note, 30 TUL. L. REV. 151 (1961).
28. Rigdon v. Marquette Cas. Co., 163 So. 2d 442 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
29. Southern Produce Co. v. American Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 59 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
30. See La. Acts 1964, No. 464, § 2.
31. LA. R.S. 22:619B (1950).
32. Gay v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 233 La. 226, 96 So. 2d 497 (1957).
But see Roche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 La. 168, 94 So. 2d 20 (1957),
which, however, dealt with an earlier statute. These cases are examined in The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term - Insurance, 18
LA. L. REV. 73 (1957).
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the company to sustain a defense on the basis of false answers
of a material nature.33
On the other hand, another court rejected, on the ground of
good faith, an insured's defense based on false and material
answers resulting in non-disclosure of a heart attack suffered
nine or ten months before the application.84 Some further de-
lineation of the proper application of R.S. 22:619B would ap-
pear to be in order.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES OF INTEREST
Miscellaneous cases included problems such as when money
is being "conveyed" by a messenger,85 what constitutes a "blow-
out" of an oil well,36 a "collapse" of a building,3 7 and a "mys-
terious disappearance. 38 Likewise, a downspout from a gutter
was held part of a plumbing system ;39 and a suspected criminal
who was accidentally killed by a police officer when the officer
fired at his leg to ward off an attack was held an aggressor,
which relieved the company of responsibility.4 0
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
Stability is a resistance to change, and consistency with an
earlier decision provides certainty; but where the prior case
was outmoded when rendered, and was so characterized, the
33. Radosta v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 163 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
34. LaFleur v. All Am. Ins. Co., 157 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
35. Sansone v. Am. Ins. Co., 245 La. 674, 160 So. 2d 575 (1964). The mes-
Senger stopped to play dice in a social club.
36. Creole Explorations v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 245 La. 927, 161 So. 2d
768 (1964).
37. Wischan v. Brockhaus, 163 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), c't.
granted.
38. Midlo v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 160 So. 2d 314 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964). See Note, Proof of Mysterious Disappearance Under Theft Poli-
cies, 24 LA. L. REV. 930 (1964).
39. Schumacher v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 154 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963).
40. Johnson v. Combined Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 63 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963);
ef. Brooks v. Continental Cas Co., 128 So. 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930) (where
the suspect was accidentally killed by the officer when engaged in flight) ; Griffin
v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 155 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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